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The last decade has witnessed dramatic changes in telecommunications sectors around
the world.  Both industrialized and developing countries are privatizing state-owned incumbent
telecom providers, introducing competition to the sector, and-especially  in the case of
developing countries where there was little-building  regulatory capacity.  The trend towards
liberalization in modem telecommunications began in the late 1950s when the US Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) allowed large firms to bypass AT&T, the monopoly
telecom provider, with microwave transmission for long-distance service (Crandall and
Waverman 1995). It gained steam in the 1980s when the UK's Thatcher government began a
wave of privatization of state-owned firms (Megginson and Netter 2000).  These efforts, in
general, appear to be succeeding in improving telecom service.  Competition tends to greatly
improve telephone penetration, as does privatization in the presence of effective regulatory
institutions (Petrazzini 1996;Wallsten 2001;Wellenius and Stem 1994).
Most empirical research on telecommunications begins studying the sector in the 1980s,
which was when widespread reforms of state-owned monopolies began.  But the trend towards
privately-run telecommunications networks around the world actually represents a return to
private provision, not a completely new phenomenon.  Private firms (usually subsidiaries of the
Bell telephone company) typically first introduced telephone service into countries in the early
1880s.  Some countries quickly nationalized their networks, but others actively promoted private
ownership and competition.  As a result, telephone provision around the world in the late 19th
and early 20h centuries was a mix of government and private ownership, where private
ownership almost always meant a competitive market in the sense that multiple firms could
obtain concessions within a country. Private firms often faced "regulations" through rules
spelled out in operating licenses and concessionary agreements.
This paper combines historical data from several sources to test the effects of government
monopoly ownership and regulation on telephone provision.  Econometric analysis of cross-
sectional data from 33 countries in 1913 and panel data on European countries from certain years
1892-1914 reveals that government monopolies lead to worse telephone penetration and higher
prices, even controlling for per capita income and year and country fixed effects. Provision by
private providers, meanwhile, could be severely hampered by capricious regulations (where
"capricious" means that the government retained the right to take over the concession with no
Page 1payment to the operator).  The countries with the most liberal policies towards private
provisioni ---Norway, Sweden, and Dermark-had  the highest telephone penetration in Europe
through the entire sample period.  Moreover, rural areas, which many people still believe v.  ould
not be served under a competitive environment, had better service across Europe on averag
under private provision than under government monopoly.
T'he  Telephone and the Telegraph
Conventional wisdom holds that an early belief that telephone service was a natural
monopoly lead countries to prefer that one firm provide telephone service, which in Europe
meant a state--owned,  rather than a regulated private, monopoly.  Indeed, network externalities
mean that the total benefits of each new connection exceed the benefits that accrue to the newly
connected person since everyone else can now reach that person.  Achieving these benefits
requires that each person to be able to reach every other person, which means that some sort of
unified service is required to achieve the greatest benefits.  However, it is not clear that there
were economies of scale in supply in the early going.  The number of possible connections
increased exponentially with the number of telephones on the network, making manual swi tching
increasingly costly with network size (Mueller 1997).
In any event, the early sector structure was not determined by policy analysis intent on
maximizing welfare.  Instead, it tended to be determined by how countries had handled telegraph
service and how they viewed telephony relative to telegraphy.  The first telegraph systems were
optical,  not electrical, and came into widespread use in Europe in the late 18"' century.  An
optical telegraph system is essentially a series of stations, each equipped with a visual sign..ling
system, placed as far apart as one could see with a telescope.'  At each station a lookout wculd
watch the neighboring station through a telescope, read the message being signaled, and then
relay it to the next station. The French War Department began building an optical telegraph
network in 1794, and bv 1842 operated a 300,000-kilometer network.  The War Department did
not allow public access to the network.  In 1833 a private firm opened an optical telegraph  :o  the
T  lLhis  technology  was,  even by the 1  8h century, probably  ancient-there  is evidence  that Greece had an exter  sive
network  in place thousands  of years earlier  for use by its arnies.  Supposedly  the Greek armies  used an opticUJ
telegraph  network  to notify  the capital  that they had won the Trojan  War  in 1200  BC. (See
http:/!www.athnet.ampr._rg.=syvLy/index.htm#o  tical for a discussion).
Page 2public, but the French government shut it down and in 1837 declared telegraphy to be a state
monopoly.  This law was then applied to the state's electrical telegraph, which first opened in
1845. The public did not have access to telegraph lines until 1850 (Holcombe 1911).
Across Europe, govermments  built state-owned electrical telegraph systems in the 1850s,
though laws did not always explicitly prohibit private ownership.  Denmark and Sweden were
notable exceptions to state ownership of telegraph.  The Swedish government did not give itself a
legal right to provide monopoly telegraph service (Casson 1910). Though the Norwegian state
did retain that right, it granted the Great Northern Telegraph Company a 30-year concession
(Andersson-Skog 2000).  This relative permissiveness continued into telephony, and by 1895
some 50 firms had telephone concessions in Denmark and by 1920 Sweden had some 100 firms.
By 1906 both countries had about six times the number of telephones per capita than did France,
while Danish per capita income was only about ten percent greater than French and Swedish
income somewhat less.
Throughout Europe the relationship between the state and the telegraph system would
become one of the most important elements determining the state's approach to telephony.
Webb (1910, p.14) succinctly summed up the general story of Europe's  initial experience with
the telephone: "The telephone was taken to the Government Telegraph departments and offered
for sale, but the Telegraph departments declined to take the risk of developing a totally new
business.  At the same time, however, they assumed control over the telephone and issued
licenses to companies formed to exploit the new invention, these licenses being generally for
restricted periods and surrounded by the most onerous conditions."  Then, once it became clear
that the public did, in fact, value telephone service, the government telegraph agency took it
over.
Private firms-usually  subsidiaries of the Bell Telephone Company-were  the first to
introduce telephony in Europe, as few governments anticipated the incredible demand for the
technology.  Alexander Graham Bell took his newly-invented telephone to England in 1878, but
found little interest in it (Casson 1910). Britain's  Postmaster General told Parliament that year
that "it is evident that the instrument is at present unsuitable for the purposes of public
telegraphy, and I do not, therefore, propose to introduce it in that branch of the Postal Telegraph
Service" (Holcombe 1906).  Several governments, whose telegraph departments viewed the
Page 3telephone as just a "scientific toy," at best (Webb 1910), including Britain, Austria, Belgiun-, and
France gave private concessions in the early 1880s (Bennett 1895).
The high public demand for telephony soon became apparent, and state telegraph
agencies saw a potential threat to their revenues.  Laws that granted the state the right to cortrol
the telegraph were quickly extended to include the telephone in order to protect the telegrap I.
Austria and Belgium nationalized its private providers soon after granting concessions, and
France took over all private exchanges by force in 1889 when the firms refused to hand ave:-
their assets (Bennett 1895).  Some countries that had not yet allowed any substantial telephc  ne
investment, including Bulgaria, Germany, Switzerland, and Luxembourg established state-owned
monopolies.
The Differing Structure of the Telephone Sector
The first experiences with the telephone left countries in Europe with very different
sector structures.  Some countries cautiously allowed private firms to provide service under-  strict
concessionary agreements.  Other countries-the  Scandinavian countries in particular--
encouraged private sector investment and initially allowed firms the freest hand in building out
their networks.  The remaining countries provided telephone service through state monopol Les.
Governments that operated monopolies ranged from those like France that showed little int:rest
in telephony, to those like Germany and Switzerland that saw the potential benefits of telep iony.
The sections below detail these different approaches.
Private service under harsh concessions: Great Britain, Italy, Spain
Some countries allowed private firms to operate under stringent conditions.  Bell and
Edison subsidiaries in Great Britain merged in 1880 to form the United Telephone Comparv
(UTC).  Though it held a monopoly concession, the firm operated in a harsh political
environment.  The British government had nationalized the telegraph system in 1871 and \'n as
concerned about recouping its investment (Bertho-Lavenir 1988). As a result, UTC's licen se
allowed it to build lines only to 2-5 miles from any city center, required a royalty of 10 pe' sent
of gross receipts, and allowed the government to buy the system at an undefined "fair price" in
Page 41890. When the government saw a decrease in telegraph revenues in 1882 it made the
concession even more stringent: UTC had to sell the post office as many telephones as the post
office wanted on terms fixed by arbitration, and was prohibited from building public call boxes.
It soon became clear, however, that public sentiment strongly favored telephone development,
and in 1884 Parliament revised the regulatory structure in hopes of stimulating competition.
Under the new regulations, UTC's concession remained the same, but the government intended
to also grant municipal concessions (Holcombe 1906).
Unfortunately, this policy failed to stimulate competition, as only six out of a possible
1,334 municipalities set up telephone exchanges in response to this new system (Holcombe
1907). There appear to be two reasons for this failure.  First, the UTC, reorganized as the
National Telephone Company ("National"), made competition difficult.  Many of National's
regional concessions covered multiple municipalities, meaning that cities felt they had to
organize service collectively to compete effectively.  Probably more importantly, however, was
the fact that all concessions were set to expire in 1911, with no agreement as to what would
happen afterwards.  In 1904 National warned that it would not sign up new customers since it
had to recoup all of its investments by 1911.  By the end of that year  10,000 people were on the
waiting list for telephone service. (Holcombe 1906).
Italy allowed private operation of telephony, though the state's overriding goal appeared
to be protecting telegraph revenues.  Indeed, the telegraph authority "reserved the right to require
the telephone companies to make alterations when they should deem it necessary for the
protection of the telegraph service at the companies'  own expense" (Webb 1910, pp.366-367).
Moreover, while concessions were granted for up to 25 years, the government could suspend
them whenever it wanted and could completely revoke the concession after 12 years.  At the end
of the concession all the equipment would revert to the state without payment (Bennett 1895).
Spain began with a remarkably open approach to telephony.  An 1884 law made
telephony the exclusive domain of the government, but the state reversed itself in 1886, declaring
that "so long as the telephonic service is administered by the State it can never develop and attain
the proportions demanded by the necessities of modern life.  Private enterprise, on the other
hand, while adapting itself to public requirements, will find in this novel means of
communication a vast field for activity in which apt initiative will be repaid by satisfactory
development" (Bennett 1895, p. 323).  In a move ahead of its time, Spain auctioned off
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allowed bid being 10 percent.  The state ultimately granted 35 concessions, with the winning
bids being a 10 percent royalty in the towns of Valladolid, Seville, Granada, and Alicante, 2  0
percent in Madrid and Saragossa, 31.5 percent in Valencia, 33.75 percent in Barcelona, and 34
percent in Bilboa.  Unfortunately, the state also decreed that at the end of the 20-year
concessions the entire system would revert to the state without compensation (Bennett 1895).
Private  service  in an open  environment.  Scandinavia
At the beginning of the 2 Ist century Scandinavia is recognized as a center for innovative
global telephony.  It is much less frequently recognized that Scandinavia was already a global
leader by the beginning of the 2 0 th  century.  Bennett (1895) exclaimed that
there would seem  to something  in the Scandinavian  blood, to which the inhabitants  of the
capital  and all the more important  coast  towns  mostly  belong,  which renders  the possession  of
many telephones  an essential  to their owners'  happiness. Wherever  two or three Swedes,  or
Norwegians,  or Danes,  or Finns of Scandinavian  descent, are gathered together,  they almost
infallibly  proceed  to immediately  establish  a church,  a school,  and a telephone  exchange.
Whatever  else in life that is worth  having generally  comes  after." (p.130)
While perhaps best left to a non-economist to test "the Scandinavian blood," Scandinavian
telecommunication public policies appear to have been well-designed to promote telephony  For
example, Sweden, Norway, and Finland charged no royalties on private firms operating
telephone network (Kingsbury 1915). And in an interesting twist on later divisions betweer.
local and long-distance service, the Swedish and Danish governments built and operated trunk
lines connecting the many local independent private exchanges.
Sweden had no legal monopoly on telegraph, and the Bell company opened exchanges in
Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmo in 1881. Local cooperatives began setting up almost
immediately thereafter (Casson 1910), and by 1920 Sweden had almost 200 private telepho,ne
networks (Andersson-Skog 2000).  Stockholm undoubtedly saw the greatest benefits from
competition.  The General Telephone Company, which started as a cooperative, quickly emirged
as a major competitor of Bell in Stockholm, and soon bought out the Bell operation.
After the General Telephone Company bought out Bell, the state opened a competing
exchange in Stockholm.  Parliament, apparently concerned about the dangers of monopoly. until
1918 prohibited the state firm from buying private firms (Andersson-Skog 2000).  Residents of
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General Telephone.  By 1914, Stockholm boasted 24 telephones per hundred people.  This
penetration rate compared to, for example, an average of 11.3 telephones per hundred people in
the 12 largest U.S. cities, 6.6 in Berlin, 3.5 in London, and 3.2 in Paris (Kingsbury 1915).
The Danish government initially stayed out of telephony altogether, and Bell opened the
first exchange in Copenhagen in 1880, selling out to the Copenhagen Telephone Company in
1882 (Bennett 1895). While the state possessed a legal right to a monopoly in telegraph and
telephones, it allowed municipalities and other local authorities to grant private concessions as
they wished.  The state built long distance lines (in competition with the larger private firms), but
otherwise stayed out of telephony.
The Norwegian story is similar.  In 1880 Bell established exchanges in Christiana (the
capital) and Drammen.  The Christiana Telephone Company soon bought out Bell in that city.
Bell also sold its Drammen operations to the Drammen Uplands Telephone Company, which
then began extending its lines to rural areas outside the town.  Bennet (1895, p. 281) noted that
"the company has shown how a large tract of sparsely populated country, containing nothing
larger than a village, can be telephoned and maintained year after year at a handsome profit."
The Norwegian govermnent was not entirely accommodating at first, but ultimately did
not block private telephone development.  While an 1881 law gave the government the right to a
monopoly in telegraph and telephone, it was also allowed to grant private concessions.  The
government made some early attempts to protect its telegraph system, mandating that telephone
systems had to remain within 11 kilometers of a city center and prohibited cities' telephone
systems from coming within 2 kilometers of each other (Webb 1910). But these laws quickly
broke down as firms found ways around the restrictions.  Indeed, the telegraph service began
using telephone lines for telegraphy rather than build new lines.
Government ownership
As the analysis below will demonstrate, public ownership tended to generate worse
outcomes than private (competitive) provision.  In large part state telephone provision was poor
because it was provided by the telegraph agency, which wanted to protect telegraph revenues.
This was unarguably the case in France, for example, which as early as 1884 rejected one private
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telegraph."  The concessions that it did grant were short-typically  four years in length-anr1
restrictive (Bertho-Lavenir 1988). The government ultimately took control of all private
networks by force in 1889.  Telephone service did not improve-penetration  remained low  -. nd
prices high.  In 1895 the French national telephone authority justified its high telephone rate  as
necessary to, as A. Lebon, the French minister in charge of telephone service said, "act as a
'dike'  against an inconveniently rapid increase of subscribers and. ..  have to be maintained until
more ample facilities should be available" (Holcombe  1911).2
The French government, however, allocated little money to build those facilities.  Imtead,
cities that wanted telephone networks were required to provide funds to the national governmnent.
which would then build the network for them.  In practice, chambers of commerce organized to
pressure local banks to make funds available for network development.  The businesses
responsible for this sort of organization, however, tended to be primarily interested in securiag a
line to Paris, not in building a local network (Bertho-Lavenir 1988). Telephone developmert in
France remained seriously retarded as a result.  While Denmark, Sweden, and Norway had 4.5,
4.1, and 3.4 telephones per hundred people by 1914, France could muster only 0.8.
But not all governments that operated telephone networks were so myopic.  Germanry  and
Switzerland both operated state-owned networks, and policymakers in both countries recogrized
potential benefits of telephony, viewing it as a complement, rather than a competitor, of the
telegraph.  Indeed, both countries saw telephone service as a way to extend their telegraph li nes
and favored early investment for that purpose (Holcombe 191  l;Webb  1910).
Germany first introduced telephone service in 1877 as an "auxiliary telegraph appanrtus,"
intended to bring telegraph service to suburban and rural areas.  In 1879 Bell asked for a
concession to build true telephone service, but the Post Office declared the telephone to be
"technically immature and therefore incompatible with the technically more sophisticated sy  stem
of the telegraph, and backers of state intervention, who stressed the threat to the Reich finan,,e
and danger of a loss of political and economic control to a foreign company, . . . decided to
interpret the legal situation of the telephone as being part of the existing state monopoly on
2  The French  governrent was apparently  a notoriously  strict employer,  as  w ell. Apparently,  operators  were r ot
allowed  to marry without  the Postmaster  General's  permission,  and were not allowed  to marry  a "mayor,  a
policeman,  a cashier,  [or]  a foreigner,  lest they betray the secrets  of the switchboard"  Casson,  Herbert  N. 1910 The
History  of the Telephone.  Chicago:  A.C. McClurg  & Co..
Page 8telegraphy that was fixed by the Constitution" (Thomas 1988, p.183).  Telephone service thus
languished, with little investment from the state beyond its complementary use for telegraphy.
Because it was primarily a means of enhancing long-distance telegraphy, penetration and
local service suffered.  As late as mid-1890s the local exchange in Berlin operated only from
7:00am until 10:00pm, while other major cities had around-the-clock service (Bennett 1895).
Nor were individuals allowed to share service, which could have increased demand: German law
made it illegal to lease a phone to neighbors, punishable by six months in jail (Casson 1910).
Finally, service suffered when the state delayed introducing new technologies.  Webb (1910,
p.64) noted that "single wire overhead line plant was largely maintained in service in Germany
long after metallic circuit working and underground cable distribution has been generally
adopted in other countries."
It is clear that governments around the world, and in Europe in particular, took vastly
different approaches to the introduction of telephony.  In the remainder of this paper I discuss
data from this early period and empirically test the effects of government monopoly provision
and regulation on telephone service.
Data
The data I use in this paper come from several sources.  AT&T was the first to compile
detailed statistics on telephone penetration by country.  I have the 1912 and 1913 AT&T reports
(American Telephone and Telegraph 1912;  1913), which report figures as January 1 of those
years, while Kingsbury (1915) reproduced the 1914 figures.  The 1913 and 1914 reports also
provide penetration data separately for cities with populations greater than  100,000 and for areas
outside those cities in selected (primarily European) countries. I pieced together earlier data
from scholarly works, including Bennett (1895), Holcombe (1906;1907;191 1), Casson (1910),
Webb (1910), and Kingsbury (1915). These sources also provided information on the ownership
and regulatory structure of each European country.  Bennett (1895) proved an especially rich
source: in addition to early figures on telephone penetration and descriptions of the sector
structure in many European countries, he also compiled data on services and prices.  Bennett's
diligent and thorough efforts allow me to apply modem econometric techniques to test
empirically the effects of the market structure on prices as well as on penetration.  Finally, it is
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obtained historical estimates of per capita income from Maddison (1995).
Telephone penetration and state/private provision
Table 1 shows 1914 worldwide telephone penetration statistics, including whether the
government, private firms, or both provide telephone service. 3 The United States had by fa- the
highest penetration rate in the world.  There are several reasons for this dominance.  First, the
telephone was invented and first put to use in the U.S., giving the U.S. a head start.  Second,
telegraph service was privately provided in the US (by Western Union), meaning that the
government did not face strong pressure from governnent  agencies to protect that industry.
Finally, once the Bell patents expired in 1894, thousands of competing telephone exchanges
popped up around the country.  Recent research demonstrates dramatic increases in U.S.
telephone investment after the patents expired as Bell competitors emerged around the cou:rtry
(Gabel 1994;Gabel 1969;Jayakar 1999).
Figure I shows telephone penetration per hundred people and GDP per capita in Eur  ope
in 1914. The dominance of the Scandinavian countries in telephone penetration is clear, des,pite
not being substantially wealthier than other European countries.  The figure shows Great
Britain-the  wealthiest country in Europe-lagging  far behind the leaders in terms of telephone
penetration.  Figure 2 shows telephone penetration per hundred people for selected years from
1885 through 1914. Again, the swift growth of telephone service in the Scandinavian countries
is apparent.
Figure 3 shows similar information for selected cities in Europe and the United States
from 1889 through 1914. Stockholm, Sweden with its vigorous competition between the private
and the state-owned firm, reached 24 telephones per hundred people by 1914, more than doable
its closest European rivals, Copenhagen (Denrnark) and Christiana (Norway).  Telephone
penetration in Stockholm exceeded many US cities: the average penetration rate in US citie; with
populations greater than 250,000 was only about 12 phones per hundred people.  Figure 4
demonstrates that in 1894-the  year Bell's  patent expired and thus the last year of monopoly
provision in the US-Stockholm,  with its competitive environment, had almost four times te
number of telephones per capita as Chicago and New York and double that of Los Angeles.
Perhaps one of the more remarkable stories in Figures 3 and 4 is that telephone penetration In US
3  The numbers  are technically  for  January 1, 1914,  and thus  are statistics  before  WWI broke out.
Page 10cities was not so different from the major European cities with monopoly providers until after
Bell's patent expired and competition broke out.
Prices and Services
As mentioned above, Bennett (1895) compiled copious information on services and
prices for European telephony.  Table 2 shows some basic prices for European countries,
including prices for connection, subscription, and other services.  The additional services, in
particular, are striking.  Today the literature is rife with discussions of a revolution in
communications as technologies converge and telephone wires carry more than just voice.  The
early days of telephony, however, also saw greater uses for the telephone than just person-to-
person voice communication.  For example, telephone services in many countries at the end of
the 19" century offered not just local and long-distance telephone service, but also
telephonograms (as defined by Bennet (1895), "a message telephoned by a subscriber to the
central office to be written down and delivered by messenger to a non-subscriber"), telephoning
mail (a subscriber calls the central office where an operator writes down the message and mails it
as a letter or postcard), and telephoning of telegrams.
While the differing structure of prices makes comparisons of many services difficult, it is
easier to compare long-distance prices.  Table 3 shows prices of long-distance service, in current
pence, for selected European countries, derived from a table in Bennett (1895, p.16).  While less
difficult to compare than the prices above, several factors cloud the comparisons.  First, some
countries charge by the minute, while others charge in three- or five-minute increments.  To
facilitate the comparison I imputed each country's  per-minute charge.  Second, the price
typically depended on the call distance, with prices increasing nonlinearly with mileage and at
different increments across countries.  The chart thus shows prices for calls covering distances
ranging from 20 to 720 miles.  Third, the maximum possible distance of an intra-national long-
distance call differs by country, since countries are different sizes. Finally, Bennett (1895)
undoubtedly also had to make assumptions to create his table, but it is not possible to know what
those were.
Despite the table's shortcomings, it is clear that the Scandinavian countries generally
have the cheapest prices, with long distance calls of any length included in the subscription price
Page 1  1in Denmark, with Finland and Sweden close behind at a maximum of just  1 to 1.5 pence per
minute beyond some distance.  The UK had among the most expensive service, with prices
increasing quickly, to a maximum of 41 pence per minute for calls that cover 720 miles.
Empirical Analysis
The goal of this paper is to explore the effects of market structure on development of the
telephone sector.  Research on current telecommunications reforms usually tries to untangle the
effects of government ownership, privatization, and competition.  Generally speaking, in today's
parlance government ownership means a state-owned monopoly telecom provider, privatiza.fion
means transforming the state-owned incumbent firm into a private monopoly (hopefully as j  ist a
first step towards greater liberalization), and competition means any firm that can somehow
reduce the incumbent's market power.  I use slightly different terminology in this paper,
reflecting the different nature of the industry a century ago.
Nationwide monopolies were almost always government-owned, as few countries
allowed private firms a nationwide monopoly.  In other words, there were essentially two states
of the world in telephone provision: (1) countries with state-owned monopolies, and (2) countries
with multiple providers, sometimes all private and sometimes with a state-owned firm as on- of
the competitors.  It is important to note that some countries with multiple firms would grant.
those firms regional monopolies.  Unfortunately I do not have any consistent information or this
phenomenon.  There is also one exception to the "private equals competition" rule: the UK had a
national private monopoly until the state took it over in 1911. However, the UK's  1884
regulation attempted to entice municipal competition, so the national telephone company faced
the threat of potential competition across the country, and actual competition in a few cities  A
more important issue in the UK, as mentioned above, however, may have been the restrictix e
concessions, which introduced substantial risk into telephone investment.
I do not have detailed cross-country information on regulations.  This lack of information
is, in part, because telephones were new and regulations, in the modern sense, scarce.  But t lis
scarcity in some ways makes the empirical analysis simpler because the most important
regulation was likely the concessions under which private firms operated.  For the purposes of
this paper I note whether a country had "capricious" regulations, which I define as whether the
Page 12country had the right to appropriate the firm's assets without compensation.  The countries in the
sample with concessions like that include Spain, Italy, and the UK (prior to  1911).4
Telephone penetration
To estimate the effects of market structure on the development of the telephone, I
estimate several versions of equation (1).
(1)  telephone penetrationi  =  o+ /3+  *,(government  monopolyd +
/32  *(capricious  regulationsd + /33  *(gdp  per capitad + s
As discussed above, telephone penetration is the share of population with a telephone. 5
Government monopoly is a dummy variable that equals one if the government owns the
monopoly telephone company.  Capricious regulations is a dummy variable that equals one if a
private firm operates under a concession that allows the government to appropriate the firm's
capital or withdraw the firm's license without compensation.  Finally, the equation controls for
national per capita income since it is typically-even  today-the  best predictor of telephone
penetration in a country.
I first estimate the equation using cross sectional data from 33 countries around the world
in 1913.6 In this case I omit the regulation variable since I do not have that information for
countries outside Europe.  The first column of Table 4 shows the results of this regression.  As
expected, per capita income is positive and statistically significant: richer countries had better
telephone systems, as is still the case today.  The coefficient on the government monopoly
variable is negative and significant. Controlling for per capita income, countries with
government monopolies had, on average, almost 1.5 fewer phones per hundred people.  This is
an enormous difference, since the average worldwide penetration rate (in this sample) was only
about 1.4 phones per hundred.
To begin focusing empirically on Europe, where I have more complete information, I run
the same regression (for now ignoring regulations) using only the 18 European countries in my
sample.  The second column of Table 4 shows those results, which are consistent with the results
4  Concessions  in  the  UK  did  not actually  allow  the  government  to take  over  the  system  without  compensation  at  the
end of the concessionary  period. Instead,  the issue  was that the government  was not planning  on renewing  the
concession  after 1911  and had as late as 1904  had made no statement  as to what would happen  after that date.
5  Even today  this measure  is the best available  indicator  of telephone  access  in a country.
6  While AT&T  (1913)  provides information  on more  countries,  GDP data was available  for only  those 33
countries.
Page 13discussed above.  Per capita income is positive and significant.  State-owned monopolies ar;
correlated with worse telephone penetration-almost  1.2 phones per hundred worse, on ave,age.
The third column of Table 4 shows the results of this estimation when including the
"capricious regulation" variable.  The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant, as is
the coefficient on the government monopoly variable, which also increases in magnitude, from
negative 1.2 without the regulation variable to negative 1.5 with it.  Private firms operating ander
stringent conditions performed even worse than the state-owned monopolies: the coefficienr.  on
the regulation variable is negative 1.65. In other words, European countries with state-owned
monopolies had 1.5 fewer phones per hundred people, on average, though countries that allowed
private firms to operate only under restrictive conditions had almost 1.7 fewer phones per
hundred.  While the "capricious regulation" results are sensible--no  rational firm would invest
mnuch  if it knows its investment will be seized-they  should nonetheless be viewed carefully
here.  In practice, for 1913 this variable applies only to Italy and Spain, where other factors may
have inhibited telephone development.  The panel analysis below will deal with this issue.
Rural service
An important part of the question of telecom reforms today is who can expect to receive
service under a liberalized market environment.  A common rationale for government provi,ion
of telecommunication services both today and in the past is that rural areas would not be served
in a private, competitive market.  The AT&T (1913) data separates telephone penetration
information for each country into the average penetration rate in cities of over 100,000 peo  le
and the penetration rate outside the cities.  While the rate outside those cities might include
suburban areas, which we would today not call rural, I use the rate outside the cities as a measure
of rural penetration, and run the same regressions as above.
Table 5 shows the results of these regressions.  Again, the regressions reveal a strongly
negative effect of state monopoly telephone provision.  The concern that the private sector would
not provide service to rural areas seems completely unfounded; indeed it was the state
monopolies that did not serve rural areas.  The main reason for this result is the large number of
local cooperatives that formed in rural areas to provide service when it was allowed.  Service
Page 14provided by cooperatives was often not of high quality, though presumably low-quality
telephony was better than no telephony.
Telephone penetration: panel data 1892-1914
One potential shortcoming with the above regressions is that they use cross-sectional
data.  As a result, it is not possible to control for country fixed effects, which could impact
telephone development.  For example, the "capricious regulation" variable applies only to Italy
and Spain in the 1913 regressions, meaning that the variable could simply be picking up factors
unique to those countries suppressing telephone development but unrelated to the concessions,
per se.  The panel data allows me to control for country (and year) fixed effects, as well as
adding the UK to part of the sample with capricious regulations, since prior to 1911 service was
provided by a private firm operating under the assumption that its assets would essentially be
confiscated in that year.
The unbalanced panel includes 17 countries for certain years 1892-1914, yielding 54
country-year observations.  Table 6 lists the countries included in the panel and the years for
which data are available.  I use this panel to re-estimate the equation presented above, this time
allowing the introduction of fixed effects.  Table 7 shows the results of these regressions.  The
first two columns show exactly the same regressions as above (i.e., no fixed effects), with
identical results.  Penetration is worse under state-owned monopolies than under private
competition, and even worse under private provision with capricious regulations.  The last three
columns of the table slowly introduce the fixed effects, first estimating the equation with country
fixed effects, then year, and then both.  The results remain unchanged: both state-owned
monopoly service and capricious regulations yield relatively poor telephone penetration.
Long-distance prices
Comparing prices of telecommunications services even today is difficult, and prices a
century ago were no simpler.  As discussed above, pricing structures differed radically across
countries, making comparisons difficult.  Some countries charged a connection fee to establish
service while others did not, some maintained a flat rate for local service while others introduced
Page 15measured service fairly early, and so on.  Nonetheless, it is possible to compare one element of
price: long-distance service, as discussed above.  I use that price data to estimate several versions
of equation (2).
(2)  long distance pricei =  IJo  + 81  *(government  monopolyd +
/32  *(capricious  regulationsd  + /3 *(gdp  per capita) + E
I estimate this equation three times: once with the dependent variable defined as the per-minute
price of a 40-mile call, once for an 80-mile call, and once for a 160-mile call.
Table 8 shows the results of this series of regressions.  In this case, per capita incomrie  is
not significant.  Long distance prices under state-owned monopolies are higher than under
service provided in countries with private service and competition.  Capricious regulations were
associated with much higher prices.  Indeed, the threat of government takeover without
compensation added more than twice the amount that state-ownership added to the average price
of a 160-mile call.  This result is not surprising: a firm that must recoup all of its costs-marginal
and fixed-in  a short period of time will have to charge higher prices in the short time it has.
Discussion
Most research studying modem telecommunications reforms use information begin.aing
in the 1980s at the earliest, when almost every country in the world save the United States had a
state-owned monopoly telecom provider.  In many ways this is sensible: consistent empirical
data does not go back much further, and, in any event there was little change in sector structure
between the end of the Second World War and the late 1980s. Case studies of telecom reforms,
meanwhile, provide detailed information on the politics and institutions factored into refonn
decisions, and the very early history may be less relevant in these cases.  Nonetheless, it is a
mistake to ignore the early history of the telephone industry.
Many countries today are wary about liberalizing their telecommunications sector,
believing that liberalized markets are untested in telecommunications.  Policy makers worry that
such reforms could lead to high consumer prices and that a competitive market would underserve
rural areas.  But telephone service was not born as a state-owned enterprise around the wor Id.
Page 16Different countries took different approaches to the new industry, with many allowing private
firms and vigorous competition between those firms, and sometimes between private firms and a
government provider.  In other words, the world already has had some experience with
liberalized telecom sectors, and we should use this information to help understand the effects of
competition and monopoly in modem service.
The results in this paper for European countries are largely consistent with empirical
analyses of reforms in developing countries today.  Telephone penetration was worse under
state-owned monopolies than under private, competitive provision.  Moreover, prices for long-
distance service were higher under state monopolies than in countries with more competitive
environments.  It is worth emphasizing that these results do not show benefits of private
telephone provision, per se.  Instead, they show the benefits of competition, which obviously
(and a bit tautologically) can occur only in the presence of multiple firms.  The fiercest
competition in Europe took place in Stockholm, between a private firm and a state-owned
operator, leading to telephone development that, for a time, exceeded US cities.  Indeed, this is
the one example outside the US where multiple firms competed within the same geographic
region, to the great benefit of its residents.
One issue I have not discussed is interconnection.  The well-known problem with
multiple telephone networks is that subscribers of one network may not be able to reach
subscribers of the other network.  That precise situation developed in the United States once the
Bell patent expired in 1894.  A vast network of non-Bell firms (the "independents") quickly
emerged.  The independents were largely connected to other independents, while the Bell
systems around the country were also connected to each other.  The Bell and independent
systems did not interconnect.  Anyone who wanted access to both networks had to subscribe to
both and thus have two telephones.  Little is written about this issue in early European telephone
networks, presumably because there were so few places where multiple networks overlapped
geographically.  In that case, the only issue was connecting regions via long-distance lines,
which is inherently less difficult than compelling a firm to connect direct competitors to its
network.  Still, even without interconnection, the early benefits of competition seem clear:
countries that licensed multiple private firms saw better telephone penetration than countries
with state-owned monopoly providers, and Stockholm, which had two non-interconnected,
Page 17geographically  overlapping,  providers  for a time had probably  the highest  penetration  rate in the
world.
Summary  and conclusion
While a good deal of empirical  research  today is beginning  to investigate  the effects  of
telecom  reforms  in developing  countries,  this paper steps back  in time to explore  the effects of
different  market structures  on early telephone  provision. In particular,  I compile  data from a
wealth of sources  to conduct  empirical  tests of the effects  of government  monopoly  ownership
and regulation  on telephone  penetration  and long distance  prices at the turn of the twentieth
century. Analysis  of cross-sectional  and panel data reveals  that telephone  penetration  was much
lower  in countries  where service  was provided  by state-owned  monopolies  than in countries  that
allowed  private firms to provide  service. Countries  that licensed  private firms under stringent
concessions  (where  the state retained  the right  to take over the firn's plant and equipment  with
no compensation),  however,  saw even  worse telephone  penetration. More surprisingly,  the
analysis also reveals that rural service was worse and long-distance prices higher under state
monopoly  provision.
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Page 24Table 1
Worldwide Telephone Statistics,  January 1, 1914
|  Number  telepbones  Telephones per 100 population
Region  Country  l  Government  Private  total  urban  rural
Us  0  9,542,017  9.7  11.9  8.88
Canada  106,183  393,591  6.5
Central  America  4,326  3,548  0.1
North  Mexico  1,319  40,542  0.3
America  Other N.A.  20  2,318  0.7
Cuba  299  15,798  0.7
Puerto Rico  300  4,088  0.4
Other west indies  2,018  4,581  0.1
Austria  172,344  0  0.6  2.8  0.3
Bosnia  1,200  0  0.1  0.06
Belgium  65,000  0  0.9  2  0.39
Bulgaria  3,608  0  0.1  1.5  0.04
Denmark  1,586  127,691  4.5  8.9  3.33
France  330,000  0  0.8  2.6  5.2
German  Empire  1,420,100  0  2.1  4.9  1.29
Great Britain  780,512  0  1.7  2.6  0.83
Greece  3,200  0  0.1  0.3  0.06
Hungary  84,040  0  0.4  3  0.27
Italy  61,978  29,742  0.3  1.3  0.12
Europe  Luxembourg  4,239  0  1.6  1.59
Netherlands  76,267  10,223  1.4  3.2  0.84
Norway  40,120  42,430  3.4  8.4  2.82
Portugal  1,203  7,647  0.2  1.2  0.02
Romania  20,000  0  0.3  1.5  0.2
Russia (European)  157,710  162,148  0.2  2.1  0.08
Finland  0  40,000  1.2  6.5  0.96
Serbia  3,700  0  0.1  0.08
Spain  2,722  31,278  0.2  0.6  0.12
Sweden  158,171  74,837  4.1  18.6  2.62
Switzerland  96,624  0  2.5  6.3  1.96
Other places  1,485  904  0.1  0.09
Argentina  0  74,296  0.9
Bolivia  0  2,500  0.1
Brazil  1,165  38,018  0.2
Chile  0  19,709  0.6
South  Colombia  0  3,177  0.1
America  Ecuador  481  2,445  0.2
Paraguay  129  370  0.1
Peru  0  4,000  0.1
Uruguay  0  13,599  1
Venezuela  341  4,688  0.2
Other places  1,413  0  0.3
British India  6,504  11,193  0.01
China  13,517  13,492  0.01
Asia  Japan  219,551  0  0.4  1.5  0.26
Russia (Asiatic)  9,423  7,181  0.1
Other places  22.110  3,114  0.01
Egypt  4,949  12,310  0.1
Africa  South Africa  28,889  0  0.5
Other places  18,089  859  0.05
Australia  137,485  0  2.8  4.5  1.77
Dutch East Indies  11,393  3,450  0.04
Oceania  Hawaii  0  7,284  6.5
New Zealand  49,415  0  4.6  6.2  4.4
Philippine  Islands  1,779  4,979  0.1
Other places  1,371  225  0.1
World Total  4,128,278  10,760,272  0.9
Note:  "Urban"  is defined  as cities  with a population  greater  than 100,000.
Source:  AT&T  (1914),  as reproduced  in Kingsbury  (1915)
Page  25Table 2
Services and Prices, Selected European Countries, 1895
Entrance  Annual  2nd
. connection  Intemal  trunk rates  Telephoning  Telephoning  mail  Pay phone
Country  Fee  subscription  charge  (pence)  telegrams  (pence)  Telephonograms  (pence)  matter (pence)
(pounds)  (pounds)  (pounds)
min call  20 min call  fixed  per word  fixed  marginal  per  fixed  per word  pence  minutes
Austria  4.17  4.17  4.38  10  40  1  0.1  I  0.1  word  I  0.1  2  3
Bavaria  0  7.5  7.71  5  20  0  0  1  0.1  word  1  0.1  2.5  5
Belgium  0  7.5  n/a  9.6  38.4  0  0  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  2.4  5
Bulgaria  0  7  n/a  9.6  38.4  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  4.8  5
Denmark-private  0  8.3  8.7  0  0  0  0.133  0  1.99  10 words  n/a  n/a  2  5
Denmark-state  0  8.3  8.7  20.4  81.7  2.6  0
Finland  0  4  n/a  1  4  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a
France  0  16  16.3  4.8  19.2  480  4.8  5 min  n/a  n/a  4.8  5
Germany  0  7.5  7.8  8.3  33.3  1  0.1  I  0.1  I  0.1  2.5  3
Holland  0  9.7  n/a  16.5  66  0.99  0  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  4.95  5
Hungary  0  12.5  n/a  46.7  186.7  2  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  2  5
Italy  0  5.4  n/a  29  29  1.92  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  1.68  5
Luxembug  0  3.2  n/a  0  0  0.98  4.34  0.98  3.36  5
Monaco  0.6  6  n/a  0  0  0  0  4.8  5 min  n/a  n/a  2.4  5
Norway  0  4.4  4.6  3.3  13.2  2.6  0.1  4  30 words  n/a  n/a  1.3  5
Portugal  0  7.5  7.8  0  0  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a
Romania  6  8  n/a  14.4  14.4  0.96  0.1  4.8  1.9  20 words  n/a  n/a  9.6  5
Russia  0  25  n/a  0  0  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a
Spain  0  8.8  n/a  8.8  35.3  n/a  n/a  1.9  0.5  5 words  n/a  n/a  1.92  3
Sweden-private  2.8  5.6  5.8  0  0  0  0  3.3  40 words  n/a  n/a  1.3
Sweden-state  2.8  4.4  4.6  0  0  0.66  0  3.3  40 words  n/a  n/a  1.99
Switzerland  0  4.8  n/a  4.8  19.2  0.96  1.9  0.1  word  n/a  n/a  0.96  3
Wurtemburg  0  5  5.14  5  20  1  0.1  I  0.1  word  I  0.1  2  5
Page  26Table 3
Long Distance Prices, pence per minute
miles Country  20  40  80  120  160  200  240  280  320  360  400  440  480  520  560  600  640  680  720
Denmark  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Finland  0.2  0.2  0.5  0.5  0.9  1.1  1.3  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5
Norway  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0
Sweden  0.0  0.0  1.3  1.3  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  4.4  4.4  4.4  4.4  4.4
Switzerland  1.0  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6
Belgium  0.0  1.9  1.9 1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9 1.9  1.9
Bulgaria  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9
France  1.0  1.0  1.9  1.9  2.9  3.8  3.8  4.8  5.8  5.8  6.7  7.7  7.7  8.6  9.6  9.6  10.6  10.6  11.5
Holland  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3
Germany  1.7  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0
Spain  2.2  2.2  4.0  4.0  5.6  7.2  7.2  8.1  10.4  10.4  12.0  13.6  13.6  15.1  16.7  16.7  18.3  18.3  20.6
Austria  2.0  3.3  4.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7
United  Kingdom  2.0  3.0  5.0  7.0  9.3  11.3  13.3  16.0  18.0  20.0  22.0  24.0  26.0  28.0  30.0  32.0  34.0  39.3  41.3
Italy  5.8  5.8  5.8  5.8  5.8  5.8  5.8  5.8  6.9  6.9  8.1  9.2  9.2  10.4  11.6  11.6  12.7  12.7  13.9
Hungary  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7
Derived from Bennet  (1895),  p.16
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Market Structure and Telephone Penetration
(absolute t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent variable  telephones per hundred population
Mean of dependent variable  14  1.  6  1 76
W_  orld  Europe
Intercep.  -O  83  -:)25  1!  !8
(0.34)  i  O.' ;
Government monopoly  -1v49  1 19  -4
2 '86  (2 18)
Capricious regulatnons  -1.65
I2198)
GDP cap ($Ct9O)  0.73  0.3-
(6.37)  (2 9O)  3.  10)
R-squared  0.58  0.4  0.54
F-test zero slopes  20.5  5.04  - 56
Num observations  33  18  18
Pare  1  8iTable 5
Rural Service
(absolute t-statistics in parentheses)
telephones  per hundred
Dependent variable  population  outside  largest
cities
Mean of dependent variable*  1.24  1.240
Intercept  -0.31  -0.005
(0.70)  (0.01)
Government monopoly  -0.86  -1.09
(2.49)  (3.29)
Capricious regulations  -1.09
(2.09)
GDP/cap ($000)  3.81  3.64
(3.84)  (4.04)
R-squared  0.73  0.8
F-test zero slopes  8.5  8.6
Num observations  18  18
* Note: Urban mean = 4.38
Page  29Table 6
Countries and Years in Panel
government Country  years  monopoly?
monopoly?
1895,  1906,
Austria  1913,  1914  yes
Belgium  1913,  1914  yes
Bulgaria  1913  yes
1906,  1913,
Denmark  1914  no
Finland  1913, 1914  no
France  1895,  1906,
1913, 1914  yes
Germany  1895,  1906,
1913, 1914  yes
Great Britain  1910,  1913,  no prior to
1914  1911
Greece  1914  yes
Hungary  1895  yes
Italy  1895,  1906,
1913, 1914  no
Netherlands  1913, 1914  no
Norway  1892, 1906,  no
1913, 1914
Portugal  1913  no
1892, 1906,
Spain  1913, 1914  no
1895, 1906,
Sweden  1913,  1914
1895,  1906,
Switzerland  1913,  1914  yes
Page 30Table 7
Market Structure and Telephone Penetration
(t-statistics  in parentheses)
Dependent  variable:  Country  Year
telephones  per hundred,  No fixed  effects  fixed  fixed  Countrye  -
mean = 1.16  effects  effects  yearFEs
Constant  -0.14  0.61
(0.31)  (1.39)
-1.05  -1.52  -2.25  -1.41  -1.09
(3.46)  (5.33)  (4.43)  (4.87)  (1.95)
-1.59  -2.14  -1.58  -2.61
Capricious  regulations  (4.23)  (2.43)  (3.99)  (5.30)
Percap income  0.61  0.53  1.11  0.41  0.07
(3.94)  (3.89)  (4.60)  (2.67)  (0.18)
R-squared  0.29  0.48  0.85  0.55  0.9
F-test  10.37  15.16  9.01  5.96  9.4
Number observations:  54
Page 31Tlable  8
Market  Structure  and  Long  Distance  Pnices,  Europe
ahsolute t-statistfics  i  parenthesesi
. . . ~~~per  mllute priee  o, call distance Dependert vari' ,.  ,bWc  c'!cn1
D40  miles  80 miles  1160  miles
Mean of depen6erlt vainable
intercept  8  0 5  S S
3  l 2)  (  9)  O,  i
G3overnrment  mcon.-oly  36
2.  P  2,  1 8 6
Capricioi  I  t:-  C,  ,
GDP;cap  7  I f'
(Jw.  8.  0)  (01.6,  >  ')33  8
R-square  K3  0 5`2  2
F-test zero slorpe  3.63  4i68
Nurn  observations  14  14  14
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